Research
Job Market Paper:
Courting the Median: Strategic President and the Distribution of Tariff Phaseouts in U.S. Free Trade Agreements
Abstract: How do presidents design trade agreements? I argue that presidents strategically allocate tariff phaseouts, which delay and soften import competition, to industries represented by pivotal median legislators, offsetting the political costs from ratifying a trade agreement. Using a novel dataset on tariff treatment covering 14 U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) and an Instrumental Variable (IV) design based on legislators’ ideological proximity to the House median, I find that pivotal legislators receive significantly more targeted phaseouts, which causally increases their likelihood of ratifying the FTA. This political transaction is specific to the incumbent; the effect disappears if a district replaces its representative before ratification. Profiling of IV compliers suggests that median legislators seek to support job-creating policies but require time for their industries to adjust to trade liberalization, confirming that tariff phaseouts offset political reservations about supporting FTAs.
Keywords: free trade agreements, tariffs, phaseout, Congress, ratification, instrumental variable
Work in Progress:
Deferring Punishment From Trade Liberalization: How Tariff Phaseouts Delay Economic and Political Consequences
Abstract: Can international trade agreements be designed to delay political fallout? I argue that phasing out tariffs can delay and mitigate the political consequences of trade liberalization. I test these hypotheses using the case of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the United States’ first and most consequential regional trade pact. First, I establish that longer phaseouts led to longer delays in employment decline for import-sensitive industries. Second, I find that counties sensitive to imports with minimal tariff phaseout punished Democratic presidential candidates immediately. In contrast, areas with more phaseout coverage penalize them later once tariffs are completely phased out. Third, Democratic Representatives and Senators who supported NAFTA are at greater risk of being voted out of office; however, greater phaseout coverage for their district mitigates such risk entirely. This article presents new evidence suggesting that highly particularistic provisions of trade agreements can delay and mitigate electoral backlash.
Keywords: trade, congress, president, election, NAFTA, tariff phaseouts